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ABSTRACT
An autocoherent model is a model which is validated by the data if peo-
ple use it to form their expectations. A structural model may be incorrect
but autocoherent, thus supporting a self-conrming equilibrium. This paper
explores some mathematical properties of autocoherent models. The rst
part claries the relationship between autocoherence and identication.It es-
tablishes su¢ cient conditions under which an expert constraints is compelled
to reveal the true value of some parameter. These conditions are related to
the traditional notion of identication, but it must be amended to reect
the performativity of the perceived model and the fact that identication
is di¤erent depending on the econometricians assumptions about the per-
ceived models validity. The second part clearly spells out the conditions for
an autocoherent model equilibrium to arise in the linear/Gaussian case, and
provides an equivalent characterization based on an "interpretation". That
is, an autocoherent model equilibrium can be constructed on the basis of
a linear transformation which maps the actual realization of the shocks to
their "interpreted counterpart", dened as the value of the shocks consis-
tent with the observed outcomes on the basis of the (incorrect) perceived
model. If such a transformation exists then the perceived model can support
a self-conrming equilibrium.
KEYWORDS: Rational expectations, self-conrming equilibrium, identi-
cation, learning, autocoherent models, performativity
JEL: A11, E6.
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1 Introduction
While rational expectations theory typically assumes that people use the
correct model to form their forecasts, more recent research has studied what
happens when that is not the case. Authors like Sargent (2008) and Fu-
denberg and Levine (2007) have argued that the economy may settle at a
point where incorrect beliefs are sustained in equilibrium, because to inval-
idate those beliefs the economy would have to engage in an o¤-equilibrium
path. This is the essence of the self-conrming equilibrium concept (SCE) of
Fudenberg and Levine (1993).
Imposing that the economy settles at an SCE rather than a rational
expectations equilibrium with correct beliefs is clearly less restrictive. In
macroeconomics, we may want to impose that agents form their beliefs using
an explicit structural model. The fact that such a model supports an SCE
then means that in an equilibrium where agents use it, the model matches
the data, i.e. correctly predicts the moments of the observables. This is
what I dene as an "autocoherent model". In such a world, a theory of how
expectations are formed is a theory of which model people use, and it is
then reasonable to impose that such a model be autocoherent. Otherwise,
the model would be "counter-performative" in that its adoption to form
expectations would lead it to be eventually rejected when confronted with
the data1.
If there are enough observables relative to the number of parameters of
the relevant model, then only the correct model is likely to be autocoherent.
Otherwise, there will typically exists a continuum of autocoherent models.
Autocoherence alone then does not su¢ ce to predict which model will be
used; a positive theory of which model is actually used is needed. In Saint-
Paul (2011a,b) I have analyzed, for some specic examples, the case where
1See McKenzie, 2006.
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the model is produced by intellectuals who pursue their own agenda, while
facing the constraint that the model be autocoherent. This approach was
a rst step in understanding the political economy of models. It delivers
some plausible predictions regarding how ideological biases may inuence the
parameter values in the model proposed by the expert (such as the Keynesian
multiplier).
Instead, this paper is more analytical and explores some mathematical
properties of autocoherent models. It consists of two parts. The rst part
claries the relationship between autocoherence and the traditional econo-
metric notion of identication. In particular, it establishes su¢ cient condi-
tions under which an expert subject to autocoherence constraints is com-
pelled to reveal the true value of some parameter. These conditions are
closely related, of course, to the parameter being identied in the economet-
ric sense, but must be amended to reect the performativity of the expert
(i.e., if people adopt his model, the equilibrium and therefore the data gener-
ating process change) and the fact that identication is di¤erent depending
on whether or the econometrician assumes that people use the correct model
to form their expectations. The second part clearly spells out the conditions
for an autocoherent model equilibrium to arise in the linear/Gaussian case,
and provides an equivalent characterization based on an "interpretation".
That is, an autocoherent model equilibrium can be constructed on the basis
of a linear transformation which maps the actual realization of the shocks to
their "interpreted counterpart", dened as the value of the shocks consistent
with the observed outcomes on the basis of the (incorrect) perceived model.
If such a transformation, which must be orthogonal for the scalar product
dened by the variance-covariance matrix of the observables, exists, then the
perceived model is autocoherent.
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2 Autocoherence and identication
We start by tackling the following question: Suppose that the model used
by people in forming their expectations is designed by an expert, whose
theory must be compatible with the data. How much discipline does such
a constraint impose on the expert? One way to tackle this issue is to ask
how many parameterstrue value will the expert be forced to reveal. This
in turn brings the question of the relationship between autocoherence and
identication.
Let v 2 Rn be the vector of correct structural parameters and v^ 2 Rn the
vector of perceived structural parameters. In general, economic outcomes
will depend both on the actual and perceived parameters, the former af-
fecting outcomes directly and the latter through private expectations and
government policies. Let M(v; v^) be a vector representing the relevant em-
pirical moments of the distribution of observables2. This vector is treated as
a function of the actual and perceived model.
Denition 1 A model v^ is autocoherent if and only if
M(v; v^) = M(v^; v^):
We can denote by AC(v) the set of autocoherent models. This set clearly
depends on the correct model. The correct model is always autocoherent:
v 2 AC(v):
2If it is common knowledge that the distribution of observables is part of a family
spanned by a few parameters, then M() is the vector of these parameters. For example if
the observables are a Gaussian vector, M() consists of the mean vector and its variance-
covariance matrix. If there is no such common knowledge, M would then be the entire
distribution, or at least the vector of coordinates of that distribution in a base of the
functional space from which the distribution is drawn.
Throughout the whole paper, sample moments are assumed for simplicity to be equal
to the true moments of the underlying distribution, that is, everything takes place as if
there were an innite number of observations.
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People may also have prior ideas (or information) about which model
may be correct. Therefore I will assume that there is a set V of admissible
models, and that any model formulated by the expert must be in V \AC(v):
Finally it is also reasonable to assume that v 2 V:
Let us now consider the inferences about the correct model that an econo-
metrician would make in this world where the perceived model might be
incorrect. One possibility is that the econometrician wrongly believes that
people use the true model, as do the people themselves, but does not observe
the model used by the people.
Denition 2  A model ~v is acceptable with unknown beliefs (or u-
acceptable) if
M(v; v^) = M(~v; ~v):
The set of u-acceptable models is denoted as UA(v; v^): Note that it de-
pends on both v and v^; contrary to AC: Two di¤erent models in AC deliver
two di¤erent self-conrming equilibria and two di¤erent values of the mo-
ment vector M(v; v^): In contrast, when the econometrician considers all the
possible models that may explain the empirical moments, the equilibrium
and therefore those moments remain invariant. That is, the econometrician
lives in a given equilibrium and cannot change it, in contrast to the expert
who may inuence behavior through the formation of expectations. It is
immediate to prove the following:
Proposition 1 8v; (v^ 2 AC(v)() v^ 2 UA(v; v^)):
Saying that a model is autocoherent is equivalent to saying that it is one
of the models that are acceptable, in an equilibrium where it is the perceived
model. Note that the correct model is not in general u-acceptable. If people
believed in the correct model, the empirical moments would be di¤erent. The
incorrect identifying assumption that people use the correct model generally
prevents the econometrician from considering it as potentially correct.
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Alternatively, the econometrician may observe the perceived model, but
be uncertain about whether it is the correct one. This leads to the following
denition
Denition 3 Amodel ~v is acceptable with known beliefs (or k-acceptable)
if
M(v; v^) = M(~v; v^):
I will denote the set of k-acceptable models by KA(v; v^):
Proposition 2 (i) 8v^; 8v; v 2 KA(v; v^)
(ii) 8v;(v^ 2 AC(v)() v^ 2 KA(v; v^)):
Now the correct model is k-acceptable, and so is the perceived one, oth-
erwise it would not be autocoherent.
For the sake of completeness, we might also consider an econometrician
who could not observe v^ and would not assume that the perceived model
is correct. He would then have to consider all the pairs (~v; v) such that
M(v; v^) = M(~v; v): However, there is nothing we will do with such a den-
ition of acceptability, so there is no need to pursue it further.
With this apparatus in hand, we can ask whether identication of a pa-
rameter compels the expert to reveal its true value. This question is not
totally obvious, because a change in the value of a perceived parameter leads
to a di¤erent equilibrium, where this di¤erent value might be acceptable even
though it was not in the original equilibrium.
To address this question I dene identication as follows.
Denition 4  Let  : Rn ! Rp be a function, also referred to as a
"parameter". Let S  Rn: Then  is S-identied if and only if: j(S)j = 1:
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In denition 4, () is a composite vector of parameters derived from
the structural ones, and S the set of acceptable models according to some
denition. If all those models deliver the same value for ; then it is identied.
Proposition 3 Let () be a parameter. Assume that for any v^ 2 V \
AC(v);  is KA(v; v^)-identied. Then for any v^ 2 V \ AC(v); (v^) = (v):
Proposition 3 tells us that if  is always identied, at any equilibrium
supported by an admissible autocoherent model, then autocoherence requires
the expert to choose the perceived parameters so as to reveal the true value
of . The proof is straightforward: for any v^ 2 V \ AC(v); we have that
v^ 2 KA(v; v^) by (ii) in prop. 2. By (i), we also have that v 2 KA(v; v^):
Since  is KA(v; v^)-identied, it follows that (v^) = (v):
It might be that for many autocoherent choices of v^;  is KA(v; v^)-
identied, but that for some other choices it is not. In that case only the rst
choices will compel the expert to reveal the true ; while the other choices
allow the expert to pick a di¤erent  since it is no longer identied by the
data generating process in the equilibrium associated with those beliefs.
Proposition 3s proof rests on the property that the true model is k-
acceptable, and so is the perceived model if it is to be autocoherent. The
unique identied value of the parameter () must therefore be the correct
one.
Things are di¤erent if the econometrician is wrong and considers only
u-acceptable possibilities. Then typically v =2 UA(v; v^): Suppose that  is
UA(v; v^)-identied for any admissible autocoherent model. Then it means
that in the equilibrium delivered by the perceived model v^; there is a unique
value for parameter  across all the possible models that would match the
same moments if they were correct and believed. But this unique value may
well di¤er across perceived models, because di¤erent perceived models imply
di¤erent equilibria and thus di¤erent moments, and there does not a priori
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exist a model v which would be common to di¤erent sets UA(v; v^) (while
instead the correct model is common to all the KA(v; v^)). Consequently, if
a parameter is identied under the wrong identifying assumption that any
candidate correct model is also the perceived one, then not only the expert
is not compelled to reveal its true value, but there is no unique value of that
parameter across autocoherent models.
3 A linear framework
I now consider a general linear framework and try to elicit some formal
properties of autocoherent models.
We consider a linear model of the following form:
Z = MX +QZe: (1)
In this formulation , X is the vector of exogenous variables. It is com-
mon knowledge that it is distributed normally with zero mean3 and known
variance-covariance matrix 
. The assumption of known distributions for the
exogenous variables is less special than it seems. For example, in a Gaussian
setting, any exogenous variable x with unknown variance 2 can be treated
as endogenous, with x = " and " an exogenous standard normal random
variable, and similarly for vectors of exogenous variables with unknown dis-
tributions.
Z is the vector of endogenous variables. Because people may not observe
all exogenous variables, they may form expectations of them, which in turn
may a¤ect outcomes. For this reasons I will assume that the vector Z also
3This follows the tradition of the literature on stabilization and rational expectations
where means typically do not matter and are usually normalized to zero. Empirically,
however, it is much easier to nd evidence of mean-matching autocoherence conditions,
than variance-matching ones. See Saint-Paul (2011a).
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contains all the exogenous variables4, and accordingly that the corresponding
sub-matrix of M is the identity matrix. The vector Ze gives me the value of
Z which is expected by the public. The matrix M depicts the direct e¤ect of
exogenous variables on outcomes, while Q depicts the e¤ect of expectations.
If Q 6= 0, expectations matter and a¤ect outcomes. If m is the number of
exogenous variables and p the number of truly endogenous variables, then
n = m + p is the dimension of vector Z: M is an (n;m) matrix, and by
reducing the number of endogenous variables when they are redundant, we
can always assume it is of rank p and therefore that p  m:
This model describes how an economy actually behaves, conditional on
expectations. As such, it is clearly incomplete. To compute the equilib-
rium, I need to know how people form expectations. I will limit myself to
expectations formation processes that have the following two properties:
A. Expectations are intrinsic, that is, for a given realization of X there is
a unique value of Ze in equilibrium. This rules out "sunspot" equilibria where
one might have Z = f(X;X 0); where X 0 is a random variable not included
in X: However, one could always allow for such equilibria by making X 0 part
of X; i.e. making it intrinsic,and add only a unit diagonal term to M to
reect the fact that X 0 does not a¤ect any true endogenous variable. So this
restriction is not binding as long as X includes all the variables on which
society may index its expectations.
B. Expectations are linear, that is, there must exist an equilibrium rela-
tionship between Ze and X of the following form:
Ze = KX:
Given K; the behavior of the economy is determined by
Z = (M +QK)X: (2)
4What is really needed, though, is to add to the true endogenous variables only a
subset of the exogenous variables, i.e. those that are observed and/or whose expectation
intervenes in one of the equations of the model.
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Under this simple structure, an equilibrium is simply a matrix H such
that Z = HX: Hence, M +QK is an equilibrium. However, to know K; one
must specify how expectations are formed.
I assume that the information available to the agents is given by two
information sets I and J: Both are represented as subspaces of Rn such
that I  J: I is the information set of the agents when they form their
expectations. That is, I assume that people observe TIZ; where TI is the
projection operator on subspace I (and we also use TI to denote its matrix):
For example, if Z = (z1 z2 z3)0 and only z1 is observed,
I = R:
0@ 10
0
1A
and
TI =
0@ 1 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
1A :
J is the "ex-post" information set, that is, the information set used by
the agents to validate their model. As long as the model is validated "ex-
post", it is natural to assume that I  J: For example, we may observe z2 in
addition to z1 once all outcomes are realized, and then we will have
J = R:
0@ 10
0
1A R:
0@ 01
0
1A
and
TJ =
0@ 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 0
1A :
Agents form their expectations on the basis of what they observe, i.e. the
vector TIZ: We know that if X  N(0;
); and if A is any k m matrix of
full rank such that k  m; then E(X j AX = Y ) = h(A;
)Y; where
h(A;
) = 
A0(A
A0) 1: (3)
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I know derive a few properties of operator h() that will play a key role
in proving my analytical results. Let B be an invertible matrix. Since
(BAX = Y )() (AX = B 1Y ); we have that
h(BA;
) = h(A;
)B 1: (P1)
Since BE(X j ABX = Y ) = E(BX j ABX = Y ) and BX  N(0; B
B0);
we have that
h(AB;
) = B 1h(A;B
B0): (P2)
In what follows I will drop the variable 
 from the argument of h(); since

 will remain the same throughout.
Since it is observed that Y = AX; the operator
(A) = h(A)A (4)
maps the realization of X into its expectation conditional on observing Y:
The preceding properties imply that if B is invertible,
(BA) = (A): (P3)
As a corollary, if A itself is invertible, then (A) = I;meaning that the actual
value of X can be recovered from observing Y: Finally, if one were to forecast
Y out of the inferred X; one would pick up Y again, implying that
A(A) = A: (P4)
These properties can be directly proved using (3).
A useful corollary of the above is
Lemma 1 (A)2 = (A):
Proof (A)(A) = h(A)A(A) = h(A)A = (A):
The theory outlined below rests on the assumption that whenever observ-
ing AX; people behave as if they believe that X is equal to (A^)X; where
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A^ is the perceived model and ; h two operators related through (4) and
satisfying (P1)-(P4). It does not really matter that h() be the optimal lter
dened by (3). Thus potentially people can use a wrong model, a wrong
lter, or both. The set of autocoherent models analyzed below is conditional
on a given lter5.
Let us now specify how expectations are formed. People observe TIZ:
They must infer from it the conditional distribution of X: Given the linear
structure of the problem, they only care about the mean of this distribution.
Then, given this mean, they must make a forecast for Z: For both of these
operations, they need a model which tells us how Z relates to X. I assume
that if people observe Y and they believe that Y = A^X; then they forecast
Xe = h(A^)Y: They then also believe that Xe = (A^)X for the unobserved
true realization of X:
In what follows, an equilibrium is dened as a reduced form matrix H
which relates the endogenous variables Z to the exogenous ones X: To any
equilibrium is associated a matrix K which maps the realization of the ex-
ogenous variables X into the expectations Ze: In a rational expectations
equilibrium (Muth 1961), people use the correct model to form their expec-
tations, which leads us to the following denition6:
Denition 5 A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a matrix H
such that there exists K 2Mnm(R);
5Conversely, one could develop a theory of autocoherent lters conditional on a per-
ceived model, which may or may not be the correct one. Such a theory would be of limited
interest: While the correct model may be impossible to know because it is econometrically
underidentied, the correct lter is available o¤the shelf of statistical theory. However, this
putative dualtheory might have some merit if supplemented with cognitive constraints
on the complexity of the lters that may be used.
Relatedly, it is conceivable that people use the right model, but the wrong lter, perhaps
because they make approximmations. The results that follow remain valid in this case as
long as the inference operators h and  that are involved satisfy (P1)-(P4).
6If h(A) 6= 
A0(A
A0) 1 then peole do not use the optimal lter and this is not an
REE in the Muth sense. One could then relabel it a "correct model equilibrium".
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(i) H = M +QK
(ii) K = H(TIH)
The second condition means the following. We have (dropping 
 from
the notations). Ze = E(Z j TIZ) = E(HX j TIHX) = HE(X j TIHX) =
Hh(TIH)TIHX = H(TIH)X: Therefore it must be that K = H(TIH):
4 Autocoherent model equilibria
We now discuss the equilibria that may arise when people indeed use a model
to set their forecast Ze; but this model may not be the correct model of the
economy.
Let us therefore assume that people use the following model
~Z = M^ ~X + Q^Ze
Ze = K^ ~X:
Here, ~X is a random variable which has the same (known) distribution as
X: A natural interpretation of ~X is that it is the agents "perceived" value
of ~X: But people do not think that they observe ~X and do not need to know
its realization, they just need to formulate a forecast. Similarly, ~Z is the
"perceived" vector of endogenous variables, but people again do not think
that they observe it. They do observe TIZ at the time of forming expectations
and TJZ when validating their model, and therefore they interpret those
values as being equal to TI ~Z and TJ ~Z for ~Z drawn from the model.
Note that the set of exogenous variables upon which the peoples per-
ceived model is based is the same as for the true model7. Indeed, I focus on
the case where the structural model used by people has the same specication
(M;Q) as the true model. That is, people use the same mental steps as an
7Confer the above remark about sunspots.
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economist who would want to compute a rational expectations equilibrium
in that economy, using a not necessarily correct model. One deep justica-
tion for such an approach is the idea that models and theories are public
knowledge, and will therefore be used by the people to form their beliefs. If
everybody in this economy believes that the model is of the (Q;M) form,
then the agents will solve this model to optimally set their forecasts.
A di¤erent option would be to assme that people have a simpler rep-
resentation of the world and use a reduced form Z = H^X instead,without
making a distinction between the direct contribution of the exogenous shocks
and that of expectations. In the literature on learning (Marcet and Sargent
(1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003)), the perceived law of motion is
such a reduced form. In the Appendix, I briey discuss the di¤erences be-
tween the two approaches.
The matrices Q^ and M^ describe the model that people have in their
minds, and it may di¤er from the correct model, which is described by Q
and M: The matrix K^ describes the mapping assumed by people from the
realization of (perceived) exogenous variables ~X to the forecast Ze:
4.1 Forecasts
How do people form expectations here? They observe TIZ; which they believe
is equal to TI ~Z = TI(M^ + Q^K^) ~X: Therefore, Xe = h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TIZ and
Zei = (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TIZ; (5)
where the "i" subscript means that this is the forecast of an individual.
This equation allows us to recover the forecast as a function of Z; given
peoples mental representations M^; Q^; and K^: Furthermore, we also have
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that
Zei = (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TI ~Z
Zei = (M^ + Q^K^)(TI(M^ + Q^K^)) ~X: (6)
This means that people believe that their own forecast is related to the
realization of the exogenous variables by this relationship.
Next, we assume that everybody uses the same model and that this is
common knowledge. In particular, the realization of the forecast variable Ze
is the same in the perceived model as in the true model, since people know
their own forecast. Consequently
Zei = Z
e = K^ ~X:
Therefore, by (6) the K^ matrix, which describes the perceived process of
expectation formation, must satisfy
K^ = (M^ + Q^K^)(TI(M^ + Q^K^)):
How does this relate to the real world process of expectation formation,
described by K? Using (5), (2), and the fact that Zei = Z
e; we have that
Ze = (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TI(M +QK)X;
and therefore
K = (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TI(M +QK):
4.2 Model validation: the autocoherence property
We are now going to impose an additional restriction on the model that
people use: it must be consistent with their observed data. The observed
data are given by the vector TJZ: In equilibrium, this vector is given by
TJ(M +QK)X:
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This determines its distribution.
On the other hand, agents can also use their own model to predict the
distribution of TJZ; since they know the distribution of X and their model
is based on an exogenous random variable ~X which has the same distribu-
tion. Thus when observing TJZ; they interpret it as TJ ~Z = TJ(M^ + Q^K^) ~X:
Therefore, for the model used by the people to replicate the distribution of
TJZ; it must be that TJZ and TJ ~Z have the same distribution, a relationship
commonly denoted by "~".
This discussion leads to the following denition of an Autocoherent Model
Equilibrium. This is an equilibrium supported by a model M^; Q^; such that
people use the model to form their forecast in a way consistent with this
model.
Denition 6 H is an Autocoherent Model Equilibrium (AME) for the
model M^; Q^ i¤ there exists K (called a forecast process) and K^ (called a
perceived forecast process) 2Mnm(R) such that
(i) H = M +QK:
(ii) K^ = (M^ + Q^K^)(TI(M^ + Q^K^)):
(iii) K = (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TIH:
(iv) There exists a random variable ~X such that ~X  X and TJHX 
TJ(M^ + Q^K^) ~X.
It will be useful, in the sequel, to use the following properties of an AME:
Lemma 2 The perceived forecast process of an AME associated with
(M^; Q^) has the following properties:
(i) TI(M^ + Q^K^) = TIK^
(ii) K^(TIK^) = K^
(iii) TIM^(TIK^) = TIM^:
Proof  (i) is proved by applying projector TI to both sides of (ii) in
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Denition 6 and using (P4); (ii) is obtained by right-multiplying both sides
of (ii) in Denition 6 and applying Lemma 1. Finally, to get (iii), right-
multiply both sides of (i) by (); getting, for the LHS TI(M^+ Q^K^)(TIK^) =
TIM^(TIK) +TIQ^K^(TIK^) = (by (ii)) TIM^(TIK) +TIQ^K^; then the RHS
is TIK^(TIK^) = TIK^ = TI(M^ + Q^K^): The terms in TIQ^K^ cancel and one
gets (iii). QED.
Lemma 2 expresses in matrix form some intuitive properties of an AME.
Condition (i), for example, is equivalent to TIZe = TIZ; meaning that the
observable part of my forecasts must match the actual observables. Condi-
tion (ii) means that the forecast of my forecast, using the perceived forecast
process, is equal to my forecast. Condition (iii) means that since I know the
forecasts, I believe I can correctly infer the part of the observables that are
accounted for by the exogenous variables, i.e. the MX vector (this belief
would be correct if the model were correct).
One issue is: Given the perceived model, is there a unique AME? This
issue is somehow the generalization of the uniqueness problem in an REE
to the AME case. My main result (Proposition 6 below) does not rely on
the equilibrium being unique. However that question is interesting in its
own right and has two aspects. First, given the perceived model (M^; Q^) and
the perceived forecast process K^; is there a unique equilibrium H satisfying
denition 6? The answer is that this is generically true. Second, given
the perceived model (M^; Q^); is there a unique perceived forecast process
satisfying (ii)? This is equivalent to having a unique REE if (M^; Q^) were
the correct model. Thus the required conditions are the same, however they
are more subtle that just I  Q being invertible, which looking at (1) alone
would suggest. All these issues are discussed more precisely in the Appendix.
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4.3 Interpretation of outcomes
Denition 6 is not very practical. But we will shortly show an equivalent set
of conditions which is far more practical. Before doing so, it is interesting to
introduce the notion of an interpretation.
Denition 7 Assume there exists an AME. Let z be a vector of Rn: Then
~x is an I interpretation (resp. J interpretation) of z i¤
TIz = TI(M^ + Q^K^)~x
(resp TJz = TJ(M^ + Q^K^)~x).
In short, an interpretation is a realization of the perceived exogenous
variables which is compatible with a given observation, ex-ante or ex-post.
The two following results are obvious but useful:
Proposition 4 Let z 2 Rn: Then if ~x is a J interpretation of z; it is
also an I interpretation.
Proof Since I  J; TITJ = TI : Thus if TJz = TJ(M^ + Q^K^)~x; then
TIz = TI(M^ + Q^K^)~x:
Proposition 5 If ~x and ~x0 are I interpretations of z; then
K^~x = K^~x0
Proof  K^~x = (M^ + Q^K^)(TI(M^ + Q^K^))~x = (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ +
Q^K^))TI(M^ + Q^K^)~x
= (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TIz; and we get the same expression if we
perform the computations with ~x0 instead.
Proposition 5 tells us that if I have an I interpretation of z; nothing is
lost by assuming that this is indeed the realization of ~X in order to compute
the forecasts. This is not surprising since the forecast only depends on the
observable TIz and is therefore the same for all interpretations.
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4.4 Autoherent model equilibria are interpretable
We now establish a characterization of AMEs which has the merit of being
easier to handle than denition 6, and at the same time can naturally be
understood as a representation of an AME based on the agentsinterpretative
activity.
Proposition 6 H is an Autocoherent Model Equilibrium for the model
M^; Q^ if and only if there exists K and K^ 2 Mnm(R) and matrix P (called
an interpretation matrix of the AME) such that
P
P 0 = 

and
(i) H = M +QK:
(ii) K^ = (M^ + Q^K^)(TI(M^ + Q^K^)):
(iii) K = K^P 1:
(iv) TJ(M^ + Q^K^) = TJHP:
Proof Assume that the conditions in Denition 6 hold. Then clearly (i)
and (ii) above hold. Furthermore, let A = TJ(M^ + Q^K^) and B = TJ(M +
QK): By (iv) in Def. 3, BX  A ~X: In particular , EBXX 0B0 = EA ~X ~X 0A0:
Since X  X 0; EXX 0 = E ~X ~X 0 = 
: Hence B
B0 = A
A0: Since det 
 6= 0;
there exists a matrix P such that A = BP; which is orthogonal for the scalar
product dened by 
; i.e. P
P 0 = 
.8 This proves (iv). Furthermore, by
8A proof is provided in the Appendix.
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(iii) in Def. 6, we have
K = (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TIH
= (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TITJH
= (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TITJ(M^ + Q^K^)P
 1
= (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TI(M^ + Q^K^)P
 1
= (M^ + Q^K^)(TI(M^ + Q^K^))P
 1
= K^P 1:
Let us now prove the converse. Assume that (i)-(iv) hold. Clearly, (i)
and (ii) hold in Def. 6. Let ~X be the random variable dened by ~X = P 1X:
Since X  N(0;
) and E ~X ~X 0 = P 1
P 0 1 = P 1P
P 0P 0 1 = 
; indeed
~X  X: Furthermore TJHX = TJHP ~X = TJ(M^ + Q^K^) ~X: Since these two
variables are equal, they clearly have the same distribution. This proves (iv)
in Denition 2. Finally, we have that TI(M^ + Q^K^) = TI(M +QK)P; hence
K = K^P 1
= (M^ + Q^K^)(TI(M^ + Q^K^))P
 1
= (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TI(M^ + Q^K^)P
 1
= (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TIHPP
 1
= (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TIH:
This proves (iii) in Def. 6.
QED.
Proposition 6 tells us that in the autocoherent model used by the people,
everything takes place as if, for any realization of X; people were using an
interpretation ~X = P 1X instead: Then, clearly, they will forecast K^ ~X =
K^P 1X = KX:
This is conrmed by Proposition 7.
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Proposition 7 Let H be an AME and P an interpretation matrix, then
for any realization x of X and its associated endogenous vector z = Hx;
P 1x is a J interpretation of z:
Proof We just have to compute TJ(M^ + Q^K^)P 1x = TJHx = TJz:
QED.
A well known example of such an interpretation matrix arises in the lit-
erature on structural VARs (Sims (1980), Blanchard and Quah (1989), Gali
(1999)). There, the variance-covariance matrix of disturbances is known, but
there are degrees of freedom in mapping the structural shocks to the econo-
metric disturbances. As a result, one formulates identifying assumptions
typically that some structural shocks have zero e¤ect on some variables 
which amounts to imposing one interpretation of the structural disturbances.
Generally the variance-covariance matrix of the shocks is normalized to iden-
tity, so that the interpreted ones will be related to the correct ones by an
orthogonal transformation, which will be the identity matrix if the identifying
assumptions are correct. In other words, the authors of the VAR literature
are explicitly undertaking the interpretation exercise that our agents are per-
forming in Proposition 4.
Condition (iv) implies that given their incorrect interpretation of the re-
alization of x people can predict the ex-post observables as well as somebody
who would use the correct model H to make those predictions and accord-
ingly interpret the data correctly9.
9Another property is that TIK = TIH: Indeed,
TIK = TIK^P
 1
= TI(M^ + Q^K^)(TI(M^ + Q^K^))P
 1
= TI(M^ + Q^K^)P
 1
= TITJ(M^ + Q^K^)P
 1
= TITJH = TIH;
This result means that despite that people use the wrong model, they make the same
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5 Conclusion
A self-conrming equilibrium imposes fewer restrictions on outcomes than a
rational expectations equilibrium. If the dimension of the ex-post observable
space is not too large, there will be a large number of such equilibria which
will di¤er according to which autocoherent model people use to form their
expectations. The present paper has discussed some analytical properties of
autocoherent models. In the interesting case where the set of autocoherent
models is not reduced to the correct one, we need to supplement the model
by a meta-theory of how the perceived model is determined. Such a meta-
theory may be provided by Bayesian learning, as in the learning literature
of Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2003). Or it can
be based on positive political economy as in Saint-Paul (2011a,b). Crossing
these two approaches and understanding how ideological preferences a¤ect
the learning strategies of experts and intellectuals is likely to be a realistic
and fruitful direction for further research.
forecast on observables as somebody who would use the right model. This is clear since
the forecast on observables is the observables themselves.
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6 APPENDIX
6.1 Completing the proof of Prop. 3
Lemma A1  Assume that A and B are two k  m matrices such that
Rank(A) = Rank(B) = k; and k  m: Assume that A
A0 = B
B0 for

 denite positive. Then there exists an mm matrix P such that A = BP
and P
P 0 = 
:
Proof To prove this, note that by replacing 
 by its Choleski decomposi-
tion, 
 = CC 0; the condition is equivalent to A1A01 = B1B
0
1 for A1 = AC and
B1 = BC: If we can prove that A1 = B1P1 for P1 such that P1P 01 = I; then
A = A1C
 1 = B1P1C 1 = BCP1C 1 = BP; where P = CP1C 1 clearly
satises P
P 0 = 
:
Thus we just have to focus on the case where 
 = I; which I now assume.
Consider the case where AA0 = BB0 = I: Then the k row vectors of A
are an orthonormal family of Rm; and similarly for B: Each of those families
can be completed into an orthonormal basis of Rm: By stacking the row of
these two bases, we get two invertible m  m matrices A =

A
A1

and
B =

B
B1

such that A A0 = B B0 = I: Let P = B0 A0 1: Then clearly
PP 0 = I and A = BP: Suppose now that AA0 = BB0 = M: Let again be
M = DD0 be the Choleski decomposition of M; where D is k  k invertible
and triangular. Let ~A = D 1A and ~B = D 1B: Then since ~A ~A0 = ~B ~B0;
9P 2 Mmm(R); ~A = ~BP; PP 0 = I: Multiplying both sides by D we get the
required condition A = BP:
6.2 Uniqueness conditional on the model
First consider the uniqueness of K and H conditional on K^; M^ ; Q^: Given
Denition 2, we note that K must solve
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K = (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ + Q^K^))TI(M +QK):
This can be rewritten K = A + BK; where A = (M^ + Q^K^)h(TI(M^ +
Q^K^))TIM and B = (M^+Q^K^)h(TI(M^+Q^K^))TIQ: Since I B is generically
invertible, this condition will generically be satised by a unique value of K:
Second, consider whether K^ is unique given the perceived model. This
means that there is only one matrix K^ which satises (ii) in Proposition 2.
The following result provides su¢ cient conditions for this to hold:
Proposition A1 Given M^ and Q^; there is at most one matrix K^ which
satises (ii) provided det(In  Q^) 6= 0 and one of the conditions are satised:
(a) TIQ^ = 0:
(b) TIQ^ = Q^TI :
(c) Rank(TIM^) = min(dim I;m):
Proof  From Lemma 2 we see that equation (ii) in Denition 5 and
Prop. 4 implies that K^ must satisfy K^ = M^(TIK^) + Q^K^: If TIQ^ = 0;
we have that TIK^ = TIM^(TIK^) = TIM^ by Lemma 2 again. Therefore,
(TIK^) = (TIM^) and K^ is solution to the linear matrix equation K^ =
M^(TIM^)+Q^K^; which has a unique solution given the invertibility of In Q^:
This proves (a). If TIQ^ = Q^TI ; then we have that TIK^ = TIM^(TIK^) +
Q^TIK^ = TIM^ + Q^TIK^ (lemma 2), so that TIK^ = (In   Q^) 1TIM^; implying
again, since (In   Q^) 1 is invertible, (TIK^) = (TIM^) (proposition 1), and
the rest follows as for (a).
Let us now turn to case (c). Let k = Rank(TI) = dim(I): Let ~Tk be the
nn matrix dened by
~Tk =

Ik 0k;n k
0n k;k 0n k;n k

:
Then there exists an invertible nn matrix U such that TI = U ~TkU 1: By
Lemma 2 K^ satises TIM^(TIK^) = TIM^: This can be rewritten U ~TkU 1M^h(U ~TkU 1K^)U ~TKU 1K^ =
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U ~TkU
 1M^: Denoting M = U 1M^ and K = U 1K^; and applying proposition
1, we see that this is equivalent to
~Tk Mh( ~Tk K) ~Tk K = ~Tk M: (7)
Assume rst that k  m: Clearly, Rank( ~Tk M) = Rank(TIM^): By as-
sumption, this is equal to k: Thus, by (7) we also have thatRank( ~Tk Mh( ~Tk K) ~Tk K) =
k: SinceRank( ~Tk K)  k; it must be thatRank( ~Tk K) = Rank( ~Tk Mh( ~Tk K)) =
k: Now, the matrix ~Tk Mh( ~Tk K) has the following form:
~Tk Mh( ~Tk K) =

A B
0n k;k 0n k;n k

;
while ~Tk K can be written
~Tk K =

K1
0n k;m

:
Here A is kk; B is k; n   k and K1 is km: We can then see that (7) is
equivalent to 
A K1
0n k;m

= ~Tk M;
implying that RankA = k and therefore that A is invertible. Consider now
the matrix dened by
C =

A 0k;n k
0n k;k In k

:
Clearly, detC = detA 6= 0: Furthermore, C ~Tk K = ~Tk M: It then follows
from Proposition 1 that ( ~Tk K) = ( ~Tk M): Therefore (TIK^) = (U ~TkU 1K^) =
( ~Tk K) = ( ~Tk M) = (U ~TkU
 1M^) = (TIM^): The rest of the proof is the
same as for (a) and (b).
Next, assume m  k: By assumption, Rank( ~Tk M) = Rank(TIM^) = m:
Multiplying both sides of (7) by ( ~Tk M)0; we get ( ~Tk M)0 ~Tk Mh( ~Tk K) ~Tk K =
( ~Tk M)
0 ~Tk M: Since ( ~Tk M)0 ~Tk M is an mm matrix of rank m; it is invertible.
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It follows that h( ~Tk K) ~Tk K = ( ~Tk K) = (TIK^) = Im: Therefore, the only
solution is K^ = (In   Q^) 1M^:
QED.
Note: Proposition A1 refers to the properties of the perceived model re-
gardless of whether it is correct and therefore also applies to the case where
it is correct, i.e. to the uniqueness of an intrinsic rational expectations equi-
librium. It addresses an issue which, to the best of my knowledge, has been
overlooked in the literature, i.e. that the lter () is a nonlinear function of
K which opens up the possibility of multiple equilibria even though I   Q
might be invertible. The meaning of that multiplicity is that the information
available to the agents for forming their expectations may itself depend on
the equilibrium matrix K; ie on the way expectations are formed. That is,
how much ltering can be done di¤ers across equilibria and some equilibria
may be more informative than others. The less informative equilibria would
be broken if people could make as precise inferences as in the more informa-
tive ones, but in those less informative equilibria expectations are formed in
such a way that information is lost. In the literature (e.g. Blanchard and
Kahn (1980), Futia (1981)) one is mostly in a context where this is ruled
out and uniqueness boils down to the invertibility of I   Q: Indeed, since
condition (c) is generic, this source of multiplicity is somewhat a curiosity.
6.3 Reduced form vs. Structural models
Denition A1 H is an Autocoherent Reduced Form Model Equilibrium
(ARFME) for the model H^ and the unbiased LIO h() i¤there exists a forecast
process K 2Mnm(R) such that
(i) H = M +QK:
(ii) K = H^h(TIH^)TIH
(iii) There exists a random variable ~X such that ~X  X and TJHX 
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TJH^ ~X.
There is then a straightforward counterpart to Proposition 4:
Proposition A2 H is an Autocoherent Reduced FormModel Equilibrium
(ARFME) for the model H^ and the unbiased LIO h() i¤there exists a forecast
process K 2Mnm(R) and an orthogonal matrix P such that
(i) H = M +QK:
(ii) K = H^h(TIH^)TIH
(iii) TJH  TJH^P .
How do ARFME relate to AME? Clearly, all AMEs are also ARFMEs
for the reduced form implied by the model that people use:
Proposition A2 LetH an AME for model (M^; Q^); and perceived forecast
process K^: Then it is an ARME for model H^ = M^ + Q^K^:
Proof By denition 5, (i), (ii) and (iii) in denition 9 hold.
It is also true that any ARFME is an AME for some model:
Proposition A3 Let H be an ARFME for model H^: Then it is an AME
for model M^ = H; Q^ = 0:
Proof Straightforward.
These two propositions tell us that if all I am looking for is an AME, I
can actually restrict myself to looking for an ARFME, which is simpler to
characterize. However, the theory is really useful in a context where not all
models are acceptable. Thus, we want to restrict the choice for (Q^; M^) to
a subset of "acceptable" models. In this case the search for an acceptable
AME cannot be reduced to looking for an ARFME. For example it may just
not be plausible to think that Q^ = 0; since it would mean that expectations
are completely irrelevant.
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